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U.S. Department of State Weekly Digest Bulletin Inbox x U.S. Department of State <usstatebpa@public.govdelivery.com> 8:45 AM (2 hours ago)  to me Public Schedule – April 6, 2020 04/06/2020 You are subscribed to Public Schedule for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Public Schedule – April 6, 2020 04/06/2020 08:03 AM EDT Office of the Spokesperson                                      ***THE DAILY PUBLIC SCHEDULE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE*** SECRETARY MICHAEL R. POMPEO Secretary Pompeo attends meetings and briefings, at the Department of State. DEPUTY SECRETARY STEPHEN E. BIEGUN Deputy Secretary Biegun attends meetings and briefings, at the Department of State. UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS DAVID HALE Under Secretary Hale attends meetings and briefings, at the Department of State. UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT KEITH KRACH Under Secretary Krach attends meetings and briefings, at the Department of State ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION CHRISTOPHER FORD 2:00 p.m.  Assistant Secretary Ford delivers keynote remarks to a CSIS Aerospace Security webinar on the U.S. administration’s approach to the evolving challenges to U.S. interests in space. (MEDIA DETERMINED BY HOST) Secretary Pompeo’s Call with Canadian Foreign Minister Champagne 04/06/2020 You are subscribed to Press Releases for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Secretary Pompeo’s Call with Canadian Foreign Minister Champagne 04/06/2020 12:08 PM EDT Office of the Spokesperson The below is attributable to Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus: Secretary Michael R. Pompeo spoke today with Canadian Foreign Minister François-Philippe Champagne. They discussed national and international cooperation to contain COVID-19 transmissions and to address the public health threat caused by the pandemic. Secretary Pompeo reiterated the United States’ desire to work with Canada to ensure the viability of international supply chains for crucial medical supplies and personnel, while also meeting the needs of regions with the most severe outbreaks. Secretary Pompeo and Foreign Minister Champagne also reviewed efforts to repatriate their citizens from cruise ships and third countries. Joint Statement from Co-Chairs of the ASEAN- U.S. High Level Interagency Video Conference to Counter COVID-19 04/06/2020 You are subscribed to Press Releases for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Joint Statement from Co-Chairs of the ASEAN- U.S. High Level Interagency Video Conference to Counter COVID-19 04/06/2020 01:21 PM EDT Office of the Spokesperson The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States and Vietnam as Co-Chairs of the ASEAN – U.S. High-level Interagency Video Conference to Counter COVID-19 held on April 1, 2020. Begin Text: The ASEAN Coordinating Council Working Group on Public Health Emergencies and United States interagency officials held a video conference on 01 April 2020 to discuss ASEAN-United States cooperation in public health emergencies and countering the COVID-19 pandemic. ASEAN Member States and the United States (collectively “We”) expressed deep condolences on the tragic loss of lives due to COVID-19, extending sympathies to those suffering from or threatened by this crisis, and expressed gratitude and support to all frontline health workers as we continue to fight the pandemic. We reaffirmed the value of the ASEAN-United States Strategic Partnership in strengthening coordination to face non-traditional security challenges, especially the unprecedented challenge of COVID-19, and to ensure the safety and well-being of our combined one billion-strong population. We highlighted the importance of ASEAN-United States collaboration in supporting international cooperation and national governments’ and authorities’ capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats, including COVID-19. All parties acknowledged that public health is a cornerstone of the stability and prosperity of our nations and the wider region. We noted with satisfaction ongoing efforts by individual ASEAN Member States and the United States and commend the proactive role and timely actions taken by the ASEAN and United States Health Sectors, and we also acknowledge ongoing efforts by individual ASEAN Member States in controlling the spread of this unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, including through various measures taken by their governments. All affirmed that emergency measures designed to tackle COVID-19, if deemed necessary at the national level, must be targeted, proportionate, transparent, and temporary, and not create unnecessary barriers to trade or disruption to global supply chains. All parties emphasized their shared commitment to ensuring the swift and continued flow of vital medical supplies and equipment, critical agricultural products, and other essential goods and services across borders, in support of the health of our citizens. All agreed on the importance of transparency and openness in sharing timely and accurate information on COVID-19 developments, both to domestic publics and international partners. The United States thanked ASEAN Member States for their support in facilitating the transit of American citizens seeking to return to the United States during the COVID-19 crisis. ASEAN Member States appreciated United States efforts to frequently update ASEAN diplomats with information on COVID-19 measures in the United States relevant to their citizens and providing them with appropriate support for matters related to the pandemic. ASEAN Member States exchanged experiences and best practices on measures for cooperation with the United States on prevention and control of COVID-19. ASEAN Member States proposed areas for expanded cooperation on health with the United States, to include human resource development, joint research, studies, and exercises in the areas of COVID-19 infection control, pandemic preparedness and response, training for doctors and nurses, enhancing biomedical research and laboratory facilities and systems, producing medical supplies, sharing information on updates on clinical management as well as sourcing of test kits, ventilators and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), research, development and production of vaccine for COVID-19, efforts to promote the normal flow of trade, services and investment, facilitation of trade in essential goods and medical supplies, and alleviating the potential downturns of the global economy. ASEAN Member States also informed the United States of their plan to explore the possibility of establishing a special fund for public health emergencies to address COVID-19 and future outbreaks, with the possibility of seeking partnership with its External Partners, and to strengthen regional cooperation mechanisms on health including the relevant EAS forum on strengthening the preparedness for infectious diseases with pandemic potential. ASEAN Member States welcomed United States critical support to multilateral organizations fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. United States funding for the WHO (over US$400 million USD in 2019) and UNICEF (at over US$700 USD million in 2019, the leading contribution among nations), have helped fund shipments of PPE to countries worldwide since the outbreak of COVID-19. Since the COVID-19 outbreak began, the United States government has committed US$274 million USD in emergency coronavirus assistance to partners worldwide to support laboratory capabilities, disease surveillance, and rapid response. ASEAN Members States encouraged the United States to further promote similar contributions and cooperation. ASEAN Member States thanked the United States for its assistance to ASEAN Member States to combat the spread of COVID-19, including the provision of over US$ 18 million in assistance to date to ASEAN Member States. The United States reemphasized its commitment in providing international public health assistance, including through over US$ 3.5 billion in United States’ support to ASEAN Member States over the last twenty years. The United States pledged continued support for exchange programs that have included training of 2,400 ASEAN medical and health professionals to date, thus building people-to-people ties between researchers and healthcare workers across ASEAN and the United States. The United States offered continued support for those ASEAN Member States in need of additional assistance. We discussed further steps to strengthen ASEAN- United States collaboration on COVID-19 response, including through high-level engagement, and on public health cooperation more broadly. This included proposals by the United States for upcoming video conferences between the United States Secretary of State and ASEAN Foreign Ministers, as well as between the United States Secretary for Health and Human Services and ASEAN Health Ministers. In addition, the United States expressed strong support for helping ASEAN Member States and the ASEAN Secretariat to develop region-wide disease control structures that could strengthen the resilience and capacity of public health systems across ASEAN. We will explore the possibility of holding an experts-level video conference to follow up and explore further cooperation on this topic. The United States also planned to expand official engagement with ASEAN’s health sector, including through participation in SOM and Ministerial-level meetings of ASEAN health officials, as appropriate. We look forward to continued ASEAN-United States engagement through existing networks and platforms under the ASEAN Health sector, as well as the ASEAN Coordinating Council Working Group on Public Health Emergencies and International Health Regulations Mechanisms, to counter the impact of COVID-19 and safeguard the health and well-being of all our peoples. The Meeting was co-chaired by Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Quoc Dzung, ASEAN Senior Official (SOM) Leader of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Assistant Secretary of State David Stilwell, Senior Official (SOM) for ASEAN of the United States. ASEAN Member State participants are Members of the ASEAN Coordinating Council Working Group on Public Health Emergencies including ASEAN Senior Officials (SOM), ASEAN Senior Economic Officials (SEOM), ASEAN Senior Officials’ Committee for the Socio-Cultural Community (SOCA), Chairman of the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPR), ASEAN Senior Officials for Health Development (SOMHD), ASEAN Defence Senior Officials (ADSOM), ASEAN Senior Transport Officials (STOM), ASEAN Directors- General of Immigration Departments and Heads of Consular Affairs Divisions of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (DGICM). The Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN was also in attendance. United States participants included officials from the Departments of State, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Briefing With Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. Sales On the United States Designation of the Russian Imperial Movement And its Leaders as Global Terrorists 04/06/2020 You are subscribed to Press Releases for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Briefing With Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. Sales On the United States Designation of the Russian Imperial Movement And its Leaders as Global Terrorists 04/06/2020 02:25 PM EDT Nathan A. Sales, Coordinator for Counterterrorism MS OTAGUS:  Good morning, and thanks for joining this briefing.  Today, the State Department has announced the designation of Russian Imperial Movement, or RIM, and members of its leadership as specially designated global terrorists – the first time in the history that the department has designated a racially or ethnically motivated terrorist group. To explain that decision and further actions, we have joining us for this on-the-record briefing our Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan Sales.  Ambassador Sales will begin with some opening remarks, per usual, and then we’ll take a few questions. Just a reminder, please, that this briefing is embargoed until the end of the call.  Ambassador Sales. AMBASSADOR SALES:  Thanks very much, Morgan, and thanks to everybody for joining this morning.  Since 2015 the world has seen a surge in white supremacist terrorism around the globe.  Last month was the first anniversary of the horrific terrorist attack on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand.  And the United States is not immune to this threat.  We’ve seen attacks targeting people because of their race or religion in places like Pittsburgh, Poway, and El Paso. Countering this threat is a top priority for the Trump administration.  After the El Paso attack, President Trump said, “In one voice, our nation must condemn racism, bigotry, and white supremacy.  These sinister ideologies must be defeated.” This administration isn’t just talking the talk.  We’re also walking the walk.  We’re taking decisive actions to counter this threat. Today, the State Department is designating the Russian Imperial Movement – also known as RIM – as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, or SDGT.  We’re also designating three of RIM’s leaders as SDGTs: Stanislav Anatolyevich Vorobyev, Denis Valliullovich Gariev, and Nikolay Nikolayevich Trushchalov. These designations are unprecedented.  This is the first time the United States has ever designated foreign white supremacist terrorists, illustrating how seriously this administration takes the threat.  We are taking actions that no previous administration has taken to counter this threat. RIM is a terrorist group that provides paramilitary-style training to neo-Nazis and white supremacists, and it plays a prominent role in trying to rally likeminded Europeans and Americans into a common front against their perceived enemies.  RIM has two training facilities in St. Petersburg, which likely are being used for woodland and urban assault, tactical weapons, and hand-to-hand combat training. This group has innocent blood on its hands.  In August of 2016, two Swedish men traveled to St. Petersburg and underwent 11 days of paramilitary-style training provided by RIM.  A few months later, these men and another person conducted a series of terrorist attacks in the Swedish city of Gothenburg.  In November of 2016, they detonated a bomb outside a cafe.  Two months after that, they bombed a migrant center, gravely injuring one person.  And three weeks after that, they placed another bomb at a campsite used to house refugees.  Thankfully, that device failed to detonate. Swedish authorities were able to arrest the attackers, and they’ve now been tried and convicted for their crimes.  The prosecutor who handled their case blamed RIM for radicalizing them and for providing the training that enabled the attacks. These historic designations are just one part of the Trump administration’s broader efforts to counter white supremacist terrorism abroad.  We’re bringing all of our counterterrorism tools to this fight – information sharing, counter messaging, combatting terrorist travel, engaging with tech companies, and building partner capacity to protect soft targets like synagogues and mosques. Today’s actions are possible because of an order President Trump signed in September of last year – the most significant expansion of federal terrorism sanctions authorities since the aftermath of 9/11.  Thanks to this order, the State Department can now designate groups and individuals that participate in training to commit acts of terrorism.  We can also designate the leaders of terrorist groups, without needing to show that they were involved in particular attacks. And let me be clear:  Today’s designations send an unmistakable message that the United States will not hesitate to use our sanctions authorities aggressively, and that we are prepared to target any foreign terrorist group, regardless of ideology, that threatens our citizens, our interests abroad, or our allies. And with that, I’m happy to take some questions. MS ORTAGUS:  Okay, thanks, everybody.  I think you know the drill, but please dial 1 and then 0 if you’d like to ask a question.  Okay, and I think we have Jennifer Hansler that has already – is in the queue?  Is that right, Ruben? MR HARUTUNIAN:  Yes. MS ORTAGUS:  Great.  Jennifer, go ahead. QUESTION:  Hi, thanks so much.  Could you talk to us a little bit about the practical implications of this designation, whether there are economic impacts that come along with it?  And then any background on why this particular group was chosen as the first designation.  Are there other white supremacist groups that also fit the bill that weren’t chosen for this particular unprecedented designation?  Thank you. AMBASSADOR SALES:  Yeah, thanks for the questions.  I would say, first of all, with respect to your last question, this group was designated because it meets our statutory and regulatory thresholds for designation.  No, we are always on the lookout for other groups that may likewise meet our standards for designation, looking at intelligence information, open source information, information that’s provided to us by our allies.  Not in a position to comment on any internal deliberations that may or may not be taking place, but rest assured we are always looking for potential designations, targets that meet our standards and that pose a threat to the American people and our interests and values. As for your first question, remind me what that was?  The practical impacts?  Yeah, let me just highlight two in particular.  First of all, this designation denies RIM and its leaders and its members access to the United States financial system.  Any assets that they had in the United States or that are subject to U.S. jurisdiction are now frozen.  We think that that’s going to make it substantially more difficult for them to move money throughout the international financial system. A second consequence that I would flag is today’s announcement makes it easier for our officials at the borders to stop RIM-related individuals from ever seeking to travel to the United States.  It enhances our watchlisting capability and our general border security posture with respect to this group.  Thanks. MS ORTAGUS:  Okay, great, thanks.  I think, let’s see, we have Barbara Usher. QUESTION:  You mentioned – you mentioned some examples of this group rallying likeminded Europeans.  Do you have any examples of this group rallying likeminded Americans?  Because you say – you mentioned Americans, that they’re playing a prominent role to get Americans into a common front. AMBASSADOR SALES:  Well, we are aware of public reports that RIM has reached out to Americans or even travel to the United States to reach out to Americans.  We’re not in a position to comment on whether or not those reports are accurate, but I can tell you that, as a general matter, any foreign terrorist group, if it seeks to make common cause with Americans, is a grave concern to the United States, a grave concern to the State Department, and we will not hesitate to aggressively use our authorities to counter such groups. MS ORTAGUS:  Okay, great, thanks.  Next we have Tracy Wilkinson. QUESTION:  It’s a similar question.  I wondered if you have any evidence that RIM has participated at all in any of the election interfering that has gone on from Russians; and second, if you have any evidence of RIM having ties to Putin.  Thanks. AMBASSADOR SALES:  On the first, I can’t comment on any intelligence matters.  What I can tell you is that the basis of the designation is RIMs provided provision of training to terrorists in Europe for the commission of terrorist attacks in Europe. As for RIM and its relationship to the Russian Government, we call on all partners, our allies in other countries around the world, to take actions commensurate with what we have taken today.  We encourage Russia, we encourage other countries to use domestic legal authorities available to them to designate this group, to deny it the ability to travel, and to cut off its access to the international financial system. MS ORTAGUS: Great, thanks.  Let’s go over to Humeyra now. QUESTION:  Hi.  Nathan, can you elaborate a little bit on what you said about you’ve designated this particular group because it met your statutory and regulatory thresholds?  That’s a little bit too sophisticated talk for, like, general audience.  Can you talk a little bit about why this particular group?  Thank you. AMBASSADOR SALES:  Sure, and just – don’t disparage yourself and your colleagues.  You are the epitome of a sophisticated audience.  So our standards for designating terrorist groups are consistent across the board whether we’re talking about Islamist groups, neo-Marxist groups, or racially or ethnically motivated terrorist groups like RIM.  We look at is it a foreign group?  We do not have the authority to designate groups with a substantial connection to the United States.  Second of all, is it engaging in conduct that meets the standards for designation, such as it is engaging in incitement to violence; is it fundraising for terrorists; is it facilitating terrorist attacks; is it directing or planning attacks?  In the case of RIM, is it providing training for the commission of terrorist attacks? The United States does not have the authority to designate groups on the basis of constitutionally protected speech.  So when we look at whether a group meets our standards for designation, we’re always looking at the presence of violent action.  That’s the sort of conduct that is necessary to get a foreign group on our list. MS ORTAGUS:  Great.  Next question, Kim Dozier. QUESTION:  Thank you.  I wanted to ask if you could go into either cooperation with Russia to hunt these actors or lack thereof.  And you mentioned Christchurch at the top of your statement.  Is there any link that you can go into more detail of inspiration of the Christchurch shooter?  Did we see social media from this group or similar?  Thanks. AMBASSADOR SALES:  Thanks.  Let me take Christchurch first.  We know that the global racially or ethnically motivated terrorist community or the global white supremacist terrorist community is very much a transnational phenomenon.  The shooter at the El Paso Walmart who deliberately targeted Hispanics claimed to be inspired by the Christchurch shooter, which I think is a bloody and grisly demonstration of how these networks interrelate with one another and inspire one another. As for RIM and its relationship to Russia and what we might or might not be doing with the Russian Government, I can only tell you that we encourage the Russian Federation to live up to the commitments it has made to countering terrorism.  We have identified this group as a terrorist organization and we encourage all partners around the world, including the Russian Government, to take this threat as seriously as we take it. MS ORTAGUS:  Great, thanks.  Next question, Nike Ching. QUESTION:  Thank you, Morgan.  Nathan, could you just talk about what impact this designation will have on domestic cases involving racially motivated extremist groups?  And separately, if I may, it appears that the State Department and Justice Department have been bouncing responsibility for doing this back and forth since at least January.  What has changed now?  Thank you. AMBASSADOR SALES:  Well, I think I would disagree with the premise of your question.  The State Department and our domestic counterparts have distinct and separate authorities here.  The State Department’s authorities begin and end at the water’s edge.  We have the authority to designate foreign groups.  We do not have the authority to designate or take any action with respect to domestic groups.  Those sorts of threats are very much within the purview of the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice. As far as what steps, if any, those authorities would plan to take against RIM or any other white supremacist group, I’m going to have to defer to them to speak to what they have in mind. MS ORTAGUS:  Great.  Next question, Shaun Tandon. QUESTION:  I wanted to follow up on Russia, on the government.  I know you mentioned your comments about the relation with the state, that you weren’t going to say much about that.  But can you say what the – whether there’s been communication with Russia before this designation?  Have you asked Russia in the past do more on this group?  And just a basic question:  Do you anticipate more designations of white supremacist groups? AMBASSADOR SALES:  So I can’t comment on any diplomatic exchanges that we have with foreign counterparts for reasons that I’m sure you can all appreciate.  But with today’s announcement, we are not shy at all in our call for other countries, Russia included, to take decisive action to counter this threat to international security. As far as future designations, once again, we don’t telegraph our plans when it comes to designations.  Suffice it to say that we are always on the lookout for groups that engage in violent activity and that present a threat to U.S. national security interests, and we will not hesitate to designate such groups in the future, regardless of their ideological motivation. MS ORTAGUS:  Great, thanks.  Joel Gehrke. QUESTION:  Hi, thanks for doing this.  Still following up on the Russia angle, there have been reports that RIM is closely – was closely associated with Russian military instructors, little green men who went into Crimea in 2014.  Do you assess that this organization is an unofficial part of Russia’s foreign policy toolkit? And regarding their outreach to Americans, do you assess the Russians as being – potential violence associated with this group in America as aligned with their interests?  Do – are we at loggerheads in that way? AMBASSADOR SALES:  So on the Ukraine question, I can tell you we are aware of public reports that RIM was among the forces that fought in Ukraine on behalf of the pro-separatist forces.  Our position on this question is clear and unambiguous.  The United States supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.  That is why this administration has provided unprecedented levels of support to our partners in Kyiv as they defend themselves against Russian aggression, including the provision of lethal assistance. As far as the connections between – potential connections between RIM and the United States, we’ve seen what RIM-trained terrorists can do in Europe and we want to make sure that RIM is not able or any terrorist group is not able to accomplish something similar here in the United States – that is to say, providing training that could enable violent attacks and deadly attacks here in the homeland.  That is why we are designating RIM today, because it enables us to better protect our borders, to keep these terrorists out of our country, and to deny them resources they might use to plan additional training that could harm our interests. MS ORTAGUS:  Great, thanks.  Next question, Jessica Donati. QUESTION:  Hi.  I was wondering if there is any evidence that RIM has substantial financial inflows or ties to the U.S. or whether the designation is going to be more symbolic in terms of impacting their financial flows.  Thank you. AMBASSADOR SALES:  Thanks, Jessica.  I can’t comment on the details of any financial holdings they may or may not have in the United States, but as a general matter, I will simply say something that is true of all of our terrorism designations:  Even if a foreign terrorist group doesn’t have a bank account at a U.S. bank, a designation still has a significant financial impact on them because it increases the difficulty of them moving money.  If they are unable to participate in transactions denominated in U.S. dollar currency, that increases the cost to them of coming up with workarounds and various other measures to try and move money.  So even if they don’t have a savings account at your local corner bank or any other presence specifically in the United States, designations of the sort that we’re announcing today can have a significant crippling effect on their ability to finance their activities and move money abroad. MS ORTAGUS:  Okay, thanks.  So we have one person left in our queue, which is Conor Finnegan, but if anyone has – we have a couple more minutes – if anyone else has a final question, 1 0, and if not then we’ll just end it with Conor, so go ahead, Conor. QUESTION:  Hey, thank you.  Nathan, just to be clear, this isn’t a foreign terrorist organization designation, it’s the specially globally designated terrorist.  So does that mean that the Department of Justice can’t bring charges based on Americans providing material support to this group, and if so, why not do an FTO designation as opposed to the other category? AMBASSADOR SALES:  Well, thanks for the question, Conor.  I’ll defer to the FBI and the Justice Department on the details of how they would handle criminal charges related to RIM, but in broad strokes, you’re exactly right.  This is an SDGT designation, not an FTO designation.  As a result, the possible criminal charge for providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization would not be available here.  However, the FBI and the Justice Department do have other prosecutorial tools available to them to bring criminal charges against people associated with SDGTs.  And again, on the details of that, I’m going to have to defer to the experts at DOJ and FBI. As to your second question, why not the FTO, the reason the SDGT is a better fit here is because President Trump’s order in September of last year dramatically expanded the utility of that sanctions authority.  I want to foot-stomp a point I made a couple of minutes ago:  Prior to those changes that the President announced in September, it was more difficult for us to designate groups that provide training to engage in acts of terrorism.  Now, that authority is expressly spelled out in the executive order. And second of all, it was previously more difficult for us to designate specific leaders of groups, because it was necessary as a general matter to tie them to specific terrorist attacks.  Under the President’s revisions, that is no longer the case.  An individual’s leadership status in an organization is itself a sufficient basis to designate them.  So we used the SDGT tool here because the President’s expansion of it made it a perfect fit. MS ORTAGUS:  Okay.  Let’s go over to Kylie Atwood. QUESTION:  Hi, thanks for doing this.  So I just wanted to circle back to your opening remarks when you cited a number of examples from 2016 with regard to RIM training and attacks that they had carried out.  But I’m just curious if you have any more recent examples, because it seems like having to reach back to 2016 may indicate that the group is diminishing in terms of what it’s doing. And then my second question is just on outreach to Americans.  Can you give us a timeframe for when the outreach happened?  Thank you. AMBASSADOR SALES:  Thanks.  So on the reported outreach to Americans, as I said a moment ago, we are aware of publicly available reports that this outreach happened.  We can’t comment on whether those reports are accurate or not, but to the extent that that outreach is happening, I can assure you that it is of keen interest – for any terrorist group that is contacting Americans – that is a matter of keen concern and interest not only to the State Department, but to domestic law enforcement as well. As far as what kinds of activities RIM continues to engage in, the specific examples we gave were from 2016 and into 2017 because that’s the specific series of terrorist attacks that these RIM-trained individuals perpetrated in Gothenburg, Sweden.  But RIM is still very much in the business of providing training to likeminded Neo-Nazis and white supremacists across Europe.  We know that they have recruited individuals from other countries in Europe and continue to do so.  Today’s designation is a way of denying them the financial resources they need to continue that training, and also to make it much more difficult for them to travel here to the United States to carry out that malign activity in the homeland. MS ORTAGUS:  Okay, and last question – we have time for one more – and it’ll be Said. QUESTION:  Thank you.  Thank you, Morgan.  My question is – I think I missed it, maybe you said it in the beginning – was there anything in particular that prompted this designation as opposed to, let’s say, all the other European groups, like the National Democratic Party of Germany and other groups?  Thank you. AMBASSADOR SALES:  Yeah, thanks for the question.  We designated this group because it meets our standards for designation.  That is to say, it is a group that is a foreign organization, not a United States-based organization, and it’s an organization that is engaged in violent conduct – in this case, training to commit acts of terrorism.  The United States doesn’t have the authority to designate groups or individuals on the basis of constitutionally protected speech.  Our authorities allow us to go after violent actions such as training to participate in terrorism, fundraising for terrorism, facilitation of terrorism, solicitation or direction and control of terrorist acts.  This group met all of those benchmarks, and that’s why we designated it and its leaders. MS ORTAGUS:  Well, thank you so much, Ambassador Sales.  We really appreciate you being on the call today.  Thanks, everybody. Secretary Pompeo’s Call with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy 04/06/2020 You are subscribed to Press Releases for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Secretary Pompeo’s Call with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy 04/06/2020 02:43 PM EDT Office of the Spokesperson The below is attributable to Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus: Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy today. Secretary Pompeo and President Zelenskyy discussed ongoing U.S. assistance to Ukraine during the COVID-19 crisis, including the planned delivery of much-needed medical lab equipment. Secretary Pompeo thanked President Zelenskyy for Ukraine’s support in repatriating U.S. citizens and residents, including more than 200 Peace Corps volunteers. The Secretary and the President also stressed the continued importance of access to Russia-controlled areas of Ukraine’s Donbas region, where Russia-led forces continue to mount attacks and prevent the work of humanitarian organizations and OSCE monitors. Designation of the Russian Imperial Movement  04/06/2020 You are subscribed to Press Releases for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Designation of the Russian Imperial Movement  04/06/2020 03:57 PM EDT Nathan A. Sales, Coordinator for Counterterrorism Washington, DC Since 2015, the world has seen a surge in white supremacist terrorism.  Last month was the first anniversary of the horrific terrorist attack on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand.  The United States is not immune to this threat.  We’ve seen attacks targeting people because of their race or religion in places like Pittsburgh, Poway, and El Paso. Countering this threat is a top priority for this Administration.  After the El Paso attack, President Trump said, “In one voice, our nation must condemn racism, bigotry, and white supremacy.  These sinister ideologies must be defeated.” This Administration isn’t just talking the talk.  We’re walking the walk.  We’re taking decisive actions to counter this threat. Today, the State Department is designating the Russian Imperial Movement – also known as RIM – as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, or SDGT.  We’re also designating three of RIM’s leaders as SDGTs: Stanislav Anatolyevich Vorobyev; Denis Valliullovich Gariev; and Nikolay Nikolayevich Trushchalov. These designations are unprecedented.  This is the first time the United States has ever designated white supremacist terrorists, illustrating how seriously this administration takes the threat.  We are taking actions no previous administration has taken to counter this threat. RIM is a terrorist group that provides paramilitary-style training to neo-Nazis and white supremacists, and it plays a prominent role in trying to rally like-minded Europeans and Americans into a common front against their perceived enemies.  RIM has two training facilities in St. Petersburg, which likely are being used for woodland and urban assault, tactical weapons, and hand-to-hand combat training. This group has innocent blood on its hands.  In August 2016, two Swedish men traveled to St. Petersburg and underwent 11 days of paramilitary-style training provided by RIM. A few months later, these men and another person conducted a series of terrorist attacks in the Swedish city of Gothenburg.  In November 2016, they detonated a bomb outside a café.  Two months later, they bombed a migrant center, gravely injuring one person.  And three weeks after that, they placed another bomb at a campsite used to house refugees.  Thankfully, that device failed to detonate. Swedish authorities were able to arrest the attackers, and they’ve now been tried and convicted for their crimes.  The prosecutor who handled their case blamed RIM for radicalizing them and providing the training that enabled the attacks. These historic designations are just one part of the Administration’s broader efforts to counter white supremacist terrorism abroad.  We’re bringing all of our counterterrorism tools to this fight – information sharing, countermessaging, combatting terrorist travel, engaging with tech companies, and building partner capacity to protect soft targets like synagogues and mosques. Today’s actions are possible because of an order President Trump signed in September – the most significant expansion of federal terrorism sanctions authorities since 9/11.  Thanks to this order, the State Department can now designate groups and individuals that participate in training to commit acts of terrorism.  We can also designate the leaders of terrorist groups, without needing to show that they were involved in particular attacks. And let me be clear:  Today’s designations send an unmistakable message that the United States will not hesitate to use our sanctions authorities aggressively, and that we are prepared to target any foreign terrorist group, regardless of ideology, that threatens our citizens, our interests abroad, or our allies. Whither Arms Control in Outer Space? Space Threats, Space Hypocrisy, and the Hope of Space Norms 04/06/2020 You are subscribed to Arms Control and International Security for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Whither Arms Control in Outer Space? Space Threats, Space Hypocrisy, and the Hope of Space Norms 04/06/2020 04:11 PM EDT Dr. Christopher Ashley Ford, Assistant SecretaryBureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Washington, DC Center for Strategic and International Studies Webinar on “Threats, Challenges and Opportunities in Space” Good afternoon, everyone.  This is only my second Zoom teleconference, but hopefully I am getting the hang of this format now.  I’m glad that we are able to find ways to keep interacting with NGO experts such as yourselves during this pandemic.  It’s great to be able to talk to you today. Outer space — or more specifically, the area of it that surrounds our planet — is today an extraordinarily dynamic environment.  Whereas for almost all of human history pretty much no one had any idea that there even was such a domain in which humans could give expression to their inherent dynamism, and whereas for some time thereafter space issues were conceived primarily through the lens of bilateral Cold War rivalry, outer space is today all but pulsing with activity and possibility.  There are more actors operating in space than ever before, with more than 100 governments and countless inter-governmental organizations and non-state actors playing some kind of role in space activity, including important sectors of industry and academia.  The range of commercial technological and entrepreneurial innovation in space is also exploding, in a kaleidoscope of fascinating innovations and initiatives — among them the advent of “mega constellations,” the build-out of 5G communications and applications in space, the development of reusable and even self-returning space-launch vehicles (SLVs), the proliferation of nanosats, and the arrival of robotics for on-orbit servicing and active debris removal.  Today, moreover, recourse to space-based communications and space-facilitated functions is so ubiquitous that there are surely few, if any, countries anywhere that do not depend upon outer space in some way for their prosperity or security. But there is also a dark side to all of this vibrancy and activity, for outer space has also emerged as a battlespace — a domain of conflict that will almost certainly be a key arena if there is a war between any major powers.  Space has long been important to war fighting, with both sides during the Cold War coming to depend heavily upon space-based communications and intelligence assets, and the early development of anti-satellite (ASAT) weaponry.  Thanks to the aggressive development and deployment of counterspace capabilities by Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however, outer space has more recently become an alarming potential location for warfighting as a real domain all its own.   This raises questions, of course, about what the international community should do about such threats to the orbital domain upon which we all depend so heavily.  Not surprisingly, the range of answers under discussion is quite broad, with some proposals being rather more reasonable than others — and some ideas being downright awful.  So I’d like to talk today about how we in the U.S. Government see these challenges, and how we are pursuing a constructive way forward.   I. The Threat   One cannot have a coherent discussion about outer space security solutions without understanding the problem, so let me first outline the nature and gravity of the space threats that Russia and the PRC present today to every country that depends upon space-based assets. The CSIS and Secure World Foundation reports that will be the focus of the panel following my remarks do an exceptional job at describing these counterspace weapon developments in detail, but let me myself remark on some of the more significant developments in recent years.   The world has known about the PRC ASAT threat since 2007, when Beijing tested a ground-based missile that destroyed a satellite, in a test that produced an appalling amount of orbital debris that even to this day – almost 13 years later – still threatens all countries’ low-earth orbital constellations.  What is less well known is that since that infamously irresponsible 2007 test, the PRC’s program has matured into an operational ground-based ASAT missile capability for destroying satellites in low-earth orbit.  The PRC is also likely pursuing additional ground-based ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites in geosynchronous orbit, where many important capabilities such as U.S. nuclear command and control and missile warning satellites reside.  It is clear that Beijing conceives of outer space as a critical warfighting domain, and that it expects to escalate in this arena very quickly in wartime.  Military and strategic thinkers in the PRC now openly talk and write about their intentions to move against U.S. satellites early in any future conflict. Despite the PRC’s irresponsible 2007 ASAT test and methodical approach to developing these counterspace capabilities, however, it is Russia that enjuoys the dubious honor of being the poster child for dangerous and provocative space postures.  Nor do the Russians bother to hide it, instead openly bragging about their development of counterspace capabilities.  In 2017, for instance, a Russian Air Force commander said that Moscow is developing new missiles with which to destroy satellites, and the Ministry of Defense admitted it is working on “a mobile attack anti-satellite system.”  Vladimir Putin himself announced in March 2018 that Russia was developing a mobile anti-satellite laser system, and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) has since confirmed that its Space Troops have indeed now received a mobile laser of this sort.  Both Beijing and Moscow, therefore, are building up their arsenal of terrestrially–based ASAT capabilities, and they don’t seem shy about showing it. But that’s not nearly the end of it, for such threats are in no way limited to terrestrially–based systems.  Outer space is a domain in which there remains a good deal of secrecy, but also one in which lots of people with telescopes can see some key aspects of what’s going on.  Thanks to observations and analyses by amateur astronomers, commercially provided information, and the orbital data that the U.S. Government releases to the public, it is now possible to talk at the unclassified level about Russia’s apparent development of in-orbit anti-satellite weaponry.  Let me give you some examples. In October 2017, the Russian Ministry of Defense deployed a space object, Cosmos 2519, that officials claimed was a “space apparatus inspector.”  The behavior of Cosmos 2519, however, was notably unusual, and inconsistent with anything seen before for on-orbit inspection or space situational awareness — and inconsistent, in fact, with any sort of device except an ASAT weapon.  Once in orbit, Cosmos 2519 deployed a sub-satellite, Cosmos 2521, that displayed the ability to maneuver around another satellite in space.  So far, I guess, you could argue that this was consistent with the declared purpose of being a “space apparatus inspector.”  But what happened next is the disturbing part: the sub-satellite Cosmos 2521 itself launched an additional object into space, Cosmos 2523 — at the high relative speed of about 250 kilometers per hour, straight off into space.  Not to put too fine a point on it, but Cosmos 2521 demonstrated the ability to position itself near another satellite and fire a projectile.      Having demonstrated this capability in October 2017 – and done so in what counts as being “in public” in space, since if you want to, you can go look up these orbital tracks yourself on the Space-Track.org website – Russia has followed up this activity with some additionally provocative satellite movements.  Since that date, as General Raymond, the commander of U.S. Space Command and Chief of Space Operations, has noted, for instance, two other Russian MoD satellites, Cosmos 2542 and 2543, were deployed last November and December and have actively maneuvered near a U.S. Government satellite in low earth orbit.  After launch, the Cosmos 2542 satellite demonstrated similar capabilities as Cosmos 2519.  Since the Russian military had already demonstrated its ability to fire a projectile from one satellite in space just over two years before, Russia’s irresponsible movements are clearly hugely provocative.  Moreover, we have some concerns about Russia’s ability to operate in close proximity to other satellites.  Last year, in another episode involving the Russian Ministry of Defense launching a supposed “inspector satellite,” Cosmos 2535 and Cosmos 2536 maneuvered near each other — after which mysterious small additional objects appeared.  The Russian Federation has not yet registered these objects, so they don’t appear to be new satellites.  Instead, the logical conclusion would be that the two satellites collided and created debris.  If so, that suggests something went very wrong with their proximity operations, which is why you can understand our concern about Russia being in close proximity to a U.S. government satellite.  There’s really no good answer: either these two satellites accidentally crashed into each other, highlighting the risks inherent in Russia’s proximity operations, or something happened intentionally.  In neither case does Russia look much like the responsible space actor one wishes it were. Together, these irresponsible Russian and PRC actions obviously represent quite a remarkable and provocative escalation of military posture in outer space.  They demonstrate the dangerous degree to which Moscow and Beijing have already weaponized the space domain in threatening ways, and they highlight the importance of the rest of the world coming together to speak with one voice in condemning such approaches and in developing constructive answers to these threats. II. Dangerous and Hypocritical Answers    But we are not the only ones talking about answers to these questions, and as always in the arms control arena, one needs to be wary of snake oil salesmen.  In what one might be forgiven for thinking is an effort to win some kind of international chutzpah competition, in fact, Russia and the PRC are offering what they describe as a draft “Treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space,” or PPWT – an instrument that purports to help solve the problems that its drafters have themselves worked hard to create.  They also proffer something Russia calls the “No First Placement” initiative, in which countries voluntarily agree not to be the “first” to place weapons in space. As you can tell from the facts I’ve already recounted, these initiatives would be humorous punch lines if the subject matter were not so deadly serious.  The draft PPWT would by careful design fail to address in any meaningful fashion the terrestrially–based ASAT systems that both Russia and China have long since developed and deployed.  As for Russia’s initiative about not placing weapons in space, a more accurate term for this efforts might be the “No Second Placement” initiative, for the point of this diplomatic overture seems simply to be propaganda, or worse.  In the spirit of Moscow’s so-called “moratorium” on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, the effort apparently aims to lock in unilateral military advantage – that is, to persuade other countries not to do in space what Russia gives every sign of already having done itself.  It’s important to make these points because not listening to deceptive or dangerous answers is an important — and often-overlooked — aspect of arms control wisdom.  Given all these factors, it is hard not to come to a conclusion that this call for quick negotiations looks like an attempt by Russia and the PRC to constrain the United States and our allies without either Moscow or Beijing having the slightest intention of abiding by the commitments they are proffering.   But having evaluated such disingenuous Russian and PRC responses to the outer space militarization problems that Moscow and Beijing have created, and having dismissed these responses with the derision they deserve, it is still necessary to look for better answers.  So how are we in the United States approaching these challenges? III. A Better Way Forward    To answer that question, let me begin by mentioning what we are doing in order to protect our security interests and deter outer space-related provocations directly before turning to our diplomatic efforts.    A. Deterrence   First and foremost, we are working to deter aggression and dangerous, escalatory provocations in outer space.  First and foremost, you can see how serious an issue this is in the President’s creation of the U.S. Space Force as a sixth branch of the armed services.  Additionally, the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) makes clear that “he United States considers unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space to be a vital interest,” and that “ny harmful interference with or an attack upon critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital U.S. interest will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing.”  This covers not just attacks upon assets that are themselves in space, but also attacks upon any aspects of our space architecture, including ground systems.  Our potential adversaries need to know that there is nothing “different” in this respect about any component of the U.S. space architecture: if you attack it, you are attacking us. Indeed, we have made clear that we do not rule out even the use of nuclear weapons in response to a sufficiently severe attack upon critical aspects of our space architecture.  The latest U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) declares that “he United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners.”  As you’ll recall, our space architecture is specified in the NSS as a “vital U.S. interest.”  This is no coincidence. In fact, the NPR goes on to clarify that the “extreme circumstances” in which the United States will not rule out nuclear weapons use “could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks.”  What does this mean? Well, according to the NPR, “ignificant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.”    I need hardly point out — but I will nonetheless, for emphasis — that the U.S. National nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) architecture depends to some extent upon space-based systems.  Any harmful interference with or attacks upon such components of our space architecture at any time, even if undertaken only with non-nuclear tools, thus starts to move into “significant non-nuclear strategic attack” territory, and would lead to a significant and potentially drastic escalation of a crisis or conflict.  It is essential that any potential adversary understand this with crystalline clarity.  And with the PRC exploring capabilities to attack satellites in orbits such as those of our NC3 systems, it is important to note that this is not just a theoretical or hypothetical question.   B. Normative Development That said, our hope is to do much more than just deter the worst sorts of behavior in outer space.  We also hope to build broad international support for norms of responsible behavior that will help forestall problems and reduce escalation and accident risks in this rapidly evolving domain. As I made clear in December at a European Union conference on nonproliferation, outer space is a domain in which technologies are evolving so quickly, private and governmental actors are intertwined, and definitions of what can be a “weapon” are so vague, that it is hard to see how traditional, rule-based and legally-binding “prohibitory” approaches to arms control could work.  I am convinced, however, that it remains possible to develop better and better normative expectations in outer space – just as we have been making progress on doing in the even faster-moving arena of cyberspace during the last few U.N.-sponsored cyberspace Groups of Governmental Experts (GGEs).  U.S. diplomats are looking, in other words, to work constructively with their counterparts in other spacefaring nations to develop approaches to outer space norms that will help improve predictability and collective “best practices” in the space domain.  There is nothing untoward about trying to develop normative expectations in outer space.  Important standards for space-related behavior already exist.   Some have grown from legally–binding instruments, such as the Outer Space Treaty (which bars placing nuclear weapons into orbit, or on celestial bodies), or the Registration Convention (which calls for registration of all space objects).  In the interests of preserving the efficacy of arms control verification, a number of arms control precedents between the United States and the USSR or the Russian Federation prohibited interference with space-based “national technical means” of verification.  The Constitution of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and its Radio Regulations articulate a norm against harmful interference with space radiocommunications services, while there are also legally binding rules against nuclear testing in outer space written in to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).  As a consensus study in 2013 by a UN Group of Government Experts noted, moreover, norms and transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) do not have to be legally–binding or be articulated in legally–binding instruments in order to be useful and contribute to constructive behavior and the promotion of global “best practices” for governmental and a broadening range of private sector space activities.  The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC), for instance, urges the provision of Pre-Launch Notification (PLNs) for missile tests in order to improve trust and confidence and reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.  The 2019 United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) process guidelines on the Long-term Sustainability (LTS) of the Outer Space Environment Activities, the  U.N. S2007 COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, and the recently updated U.S. Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices are also articulations of expected “best practices” that are proving helpful in the outer space domain. There is also constructive thinking underway in both government and the private sector about how to formulate analogous best practices in areas such as satellite collision avoidance, and on-orbit rendezvous and servicing operations and utilization of space resources.  As a result, U.S. diplomatic engagements on these issues rely on extensive and thoughtful inputs provided by American companies and academic experts. So far, however, none of these various efforts, as salutary as they are, have yet directly addressed the security problems that are emerging as a result of ongoing Russian and PRC weaponization of the space domain and placement of weapons in outer space.  We clearly need to do more to develop non-legally–binding international norms of responsible behavior that are complementary to the existing legal regime – both through “bottom-up” best practices developed cooperatively with other the full range of established an ReplyForward